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Abstract 
There is a protracted stalemate between rich (the North) and poor (the South) 
countries  over  the  question  of  minimum  labour  standards  in  developing 
economies. This  paper  is a  sequel  to Singh  and  Zammit (2000). It  considers 
afresh key issues in the controversy. While fully recognizing the moral, political 
and philosophical dimension of this complex issue, the paper concentrates on 
the central economic question of the “race to the bottom”. It emphasizes the 
difficulties  of  establishing  labour  standards  in  the  vast  informal  sectors  in 
developing countries and suggests that the ILO conventions 87 and 98 should be 
amended  to  properly  reflect  these  concerns. It  also  argues  that  ILO  core 
conventions  should  be  broadened  to  include  the  right  to  decent  living. The 
overall conclusion is that labour standards are important indicators of economic 
development  but  their  promotion  is  best  achieved  in  a  non-coercive  and 
supportive international environment such as that provided by the ILO. 
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1.  Introduction:  The Context and the Current State of the Controversy 
 
The question of establishing minimum labour standards in developing countries 
as a foundation for globalisation raises complex issues in many dimensions – 
economic, political, moral and philosophical. The subject is also deeply divisive 
as it pits workers of the North (the rich countries) against those of the South (the 
poor  countries).  For  the last twenty  years  the United  States and  a group  of 
advanced countries, US trade unions, and the International Confederation of 
Free  Trade  Unions  (ICFTU),  have  led  a  concerted  campaign  at  GATT  and 
subsequently  at  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  for  instituting  higher 
labour standards in developing countries. Developing countries have, however, 
resolutely opposed any discussion of labour standards at the WTO regarding 
these as thinly veiled protectionist devices.
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The  labour  standards  at  issue  are  those  embodied  in  the  various  ILO 
Conventions  (see  Table  1).  Of  these,  freedom  of  association  and  collective 
bargaining (Nos. 87 and 98), freedom from forced labour and discrimination 
(Nos.  29,  105,  111)  and  abolition  of  child  labour  (No.  138,  subsequently 
amplified by the Convention Concerning the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour, Convention No.182), are regarded as the basic principles of the 
ILO. At the 1998 ILO conference, the Declaration of Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, embodying the seven core conventions in Table 1, was 
unanimously adopted by the member states. By doing so, the nations of the 
world accepted the obligation to implement the core conventions by virtue of 
their membership of the ILO, whether or not they had ratified the conventions 
themselves. The Declaration, however, stated explicitly that labour standards 
should not be used for protectionist purposes. It also suggested that these basic 
principles and rights should not in any way affect the comparative advantage of 
any country (say, for example, in labour intensive goods). It is significant that 
the core conventions do not include minimum wage as that might have been 
regarded  as  distorting  a  country’s  comparative  advantage.  Although  the 
Declaration  provided  for  annual  reports  by  the  Director-General  on  the 
implementation of these conventions, the U.S. and its allies complained that the 
ILO had no teeth, i.e. it was unable to use any sanctions against the offenders. 
Advanced  countries  would  therefore  prefer  WTO,  which  has  a  dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM) as well as an ability to impose sanctions, to take 
up labour standards as an important part of its mission. Developing countries 
totally disagree, and do not wish for the matter even to be raised at the WTO. 
There has thus been a protracted stalemate between the North and the South on 
this critical issue. 
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Table 1.  ILO’s Core Conventions 
 



















2.  Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize 
1948  No. 87  128 
3.  Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining  1949  No. 98  146 
4.  Equal Remuneration  1951  No. 100  145 
5.  Abolition of Forced Labour  1957  No. 105  144 
6.  Discrimination Convention (Employment 
and Occupation) 
1958  No. 111  142 
7.  Minimum Age
2  1973  No. 138   88 
 
 
Source: Singh and Zammit (2000), pp. 79. 
 
 
After the failure of the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September 2003, the 
future of the WTO, and indeed of the multilateral trading system, is very much 
in flux. Nevertheless, the issues examined in this paper continue to be highly 
relevant, as the U.S. government is taking unilateral initiatives to enforce its 
agenda  on  these  matters  in  regional  and  bilateral  treaties  with  individual 
developing  countries  [Palley  (2003);  Elliot  and  Freeman  (2003)].  Bhagwati 
(2003)  suggests that  the  Bush  administration  and  the Congress use  the  new 
bilateral treaties with labour standards as templates for future such treaties with 
other countries, as well as for multilateral agreements. 
  
This  paper  is  a  sequel  to  our  earlier  policy  monograph  Singh  and  Zammit 
(2000), which examined the labour standards issue from a developing country 
perspective that took poverty elimination and decent work for all as the prime 
objectives. Since that time, the debate on the subject has become even more 
intense and a large amount of literature both from academics and civil society 
organisations continues to come out. The complexities of the issues involved 
have  lead  to  quite  unexpected  groupings  of  opponents  and  proponents  of 
standards. Thus the opponents include not only the employers in developing 
countries (as one would expect), but also trade unions, governments, NGOs and 
progressive  intellectuals  in  the  South  as  well  as  the  North.  Similarly,  the 
proponents  include  not  only  the  US  trade  unions  but  also  importantly, 
progressive students in US universities as well as governments and intellectuals 
(mainly from the North but notably some also from the South).  
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In the recent period, there have been two major academic contributions, which 
help to clarify the main issues, without necessarily resolving them. The first is 
Basu et al. (2003) which brings together perspectives on labour standards from 
economic history, theoretical economics, analyses of child labour and the role 
of  international  organisations  by  a  distinguished  list  of  US  and  non-US 
academics. The second contribution, Elliott and Freeman (2003), among other 
things provides a comprehensive analysis of the successes and failures of the 
U.S. campus anti-sweatshop movement. The latter, together with a large number 
of other NGOs, has been playing a prominent role in this sphere at the grass 
roots level. This movement has succeeded in persuading many big corporations 
to undertake to end child labour, provide minimum wages and decent conditions 
of  work  for  their  direct  employees  and  those  of  their  sub-contractors  in 
developing countries. They have also been able to persuade many consumers in 
the North to pay higher prices for goods produced in establishments with proper 
labour standards. A forthcoming contribution by Naila Kabeer (2004) is also 
important for its analysis of the labour standards issue from a women’s rights 
perspective in a developing country context. 
 
The developing country arguments against compulsory internationally imposed 
labour standards were explained in Singh and Zammit (2000). The essential 
point  of  these  arguments  was  that,  as  signatories  to  the  ILO  conventions, 
developing  countries  are  committed  to  labour  standards:  indeed  raising 
standards for  all the  working  people  is  regarded  as being  synonymous  with 
development. The reasons that developing countries are unable to implement 
labour  standards  quickly  is,  not  because  their  governments  are  corrupt  or 
perverse,  but  largely  because  of  the  structure  of  their  economies  and  their 
economic circumstances. The main issue is therefore not whether developing 
countries should have labour standards, but rather what should these standards 
be, and what is the best way of implementing them? Is it best done through a 
multilateral  agreement  at  the  WTO,  or  are  there  other  means  that  are  more 
appropriate?  
 
The present paper will analyse some key issues in this ongoing debate. While 
fully recognising the significance of the social and moral issues, the paper will 
focus  first  and  foremost  on  the  economic  questions,  particularly  that  of  the 
so-called ‘race to the bottom’. The concern with the latter issue goes back to the 
founding of the ILO 80 years ago; the Preamble to its Constitution notes
3: 
 
‘The failure of any nations to adopt humane conditions of labor is an 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  other  nations  which  desire  to  improve 
conditions in their own countries.’ 
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This ‘race to the bottom’, as we shall see below, has emerged as a key economic 
issue in both the intellectual argument on labour standards as well as in the 
political campaign of the activists. It is also arguably a significant factor in the 
U.S. government’s stance on labour standards, which has had bipartisan support 
in Congress and the Administrations for many decades. 
 
Secondly, the paper will discuss the question of labour standards in the informal 
sector. It will be argued here that an important step forward would be to amend 
Conventions 87 and 98 of the ILO, so as to recognise the different kinds of 
representation and the types of redress needed by those engaged in agriculture 
and in the informal sector in developing countries. The legitimate role of the 
state  to  represent  the  interest  of  those  who  are  excluded  in  the  collective 
bargaining  between  the  employers  and  employees  in  the  formal  sector  also 
needs to be explicitly acknowledged. 
 
Thirdly,  the  paper  takes  forward  the  controversy  on  labour  standards  by 
departing from orthodox analysis in two other ways. One, it seeks to connect 
more  precisely  the  issues  of  poverty  and  labour  standards  by  purposefully 
introducing economic growth into the analysis
4. Two, it will argue that there is 
much common cause between workers in the North and in the South. However, 
for this common cause to prevail, labour in the North and the South should 
propose  solidaristic  globalisation  involving  radical  changes  in  the  current 
pattern, which would benefit workers all over the world. Such community of 
interest between working people of the North and the South is entirely feasible 
and wholly desirable.  
 
It is important to be clear about what is meant by labour standards. In order to 
have a focussed analysis, this paper will be concerned mostly with the ILO’s 
core  labour  standards  mentioned  earlier.  However,  within  these,  it  will 
concentrate  on  two  of  them:  freedom  of  association  and  the  right  to  free 
collective  bargaining  (FACB).  These  two,  apart  from  child  labour,  have 
generated  most  controversy  in  international  discussions.
5  An  important 
argument of the proponents is that FACB do not affect a country’s comparative 
advantage  and  should  therefore  be  acceptable  to  developing  countries. 
However, there is also a rather different line of analysis which suggests that if 
these two sets of rights were available to developing country workers, it would 
empower them to fight against sweatshop conditions of work as well as to be 
able to obtain their due share of fruits of economic growth through trade union 
action. The emphasis on these two standards should not obscure the fact that 
apart  from  the  other  core  standards  (particularly  child  labour),  a  number  of 
non-core standards including health and safety and minimum wages are also 
salient. This paper concentrates on the two core standards but other standards   5 
 
will  also  be  referred  to  as  appropriate.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the 
question of minimum wage as this is an important part of the US anti-sweat 
shop movement’s campaign for a ‘living wage’. As Elliot and Freeman note, the 
lines between core and non-core standards have become blurred in the course of 
this campaign. Importantly, minimum wage is included in many of the U.S. 
bilateral or plurilateral treaties with developing countries. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 consider the concept of the 
‘race to the bottom’ for developed countries in analytical and empirical terms. 
The  essential  question  is  how,  and  to  what  extent if  any,  deficits  in  labour 
standards in developing countries affect the well-being of the North’s workers. 
Sections 4 and 5 will examine the analogous question for developing countries: 
how might the imposition of labour standards harm their competitiveness and 
thereby their prospects for achieving fast economic growth? In each case we 
shall attempt to provide, as far as possible, empirical answers to these questions 
on the basis of the available research. Sections 6 and 7 consider important issues 
of labour standards in relation to the informal sector, the question of sanctions, 
the role of ILO and the WTO and the elements of solidaristic globalisation. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Race to the Bottom and Labour Market Deficits in Advanced Countries 
 
Does the absence or the non-implementation of labour standards in developing 
countries lead to difficulties in the labour market for advanced country workers, 
or to the erosion of their own standards? The question is important because if 
the outcome is large and negative for the North’s workers, it does not augur 
well for co-operation between them and workers in the South. The latter in turn 
may not accept standards if their own economic well-being is threatened by 
them. These are of course pre-eminently empirical questions that stand at the 
heart of the debate on labour standards.   
 
However, before these questions can be considered, there is a prior issue that 
needs to be addressed at the outset. It should be recognised that if one literally 
takes the view, as some proponents of labour standards do, that the core labour 
conventions  have  the  same  status  as  fundamental  human  rights,  which  all 
countries  should  apply  regardless  of  their  level  of  development  or  their 
economic costs and benefits, there is not much room left for economic analysis. 
If  labour  standards are  a  fundamental  human  right,  then  by  definition  these 
should  be  applied  as  speedily  as  possible  without  much  attention  to  their 
economics.
6 Fortunately, most analysts do not share this absolutist position.
7   
Even the UN High Commission for Human Rights recognises that some human   6 
 
rights cannot be implemented at a stroke, but are goals to be worked towards 
(Robinson, 2000). 
     
In the language of welfare economics, the ‘race to the bottom’ theory may be 
regarded as a cross-border externality of low labour standards in poor countries 
for labour in the richer countries. This justifies intervention to correct it, say by 
international agreement or by an international agency. This is of course subject 
to  the  usual  caveats  including  the  assumption  in  this  case  that  there  are  no 
significant  costs  arising  from  failures  in  international  governance.  Staiger 
(2003) provides a more complex analysis of the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in terms of  
“pecuniary”  and  “non-pecuniary”  international  externalities.  The  pecuniary 
externality  arises  from  the fact that, say,  the US is concerned about  India’s 
labour standards because of their implications for the economic well-being of 
US citizens. However, if the externality from, say, poor Indian labour standards 
is  viewed  by  the  US  in  political  or  in humanitarian terms, the international 
externality would be non-pecuniary. Staiger goes on to draw implications from 
this  kind  of  analysis for  whether the  appropriate  regulatory  body  for  labour 
standards should be the WTO or the ILO.
8  
 
However, in less abstract and more empirical terms, the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
hypothesis can be examined in two forms. In its weaker form, it simply suggests 
that  advanced  country  workers  will  be  subject  to  serious  difficulties  in  the 
labour market, as a result of globalisation without adequate labour standards. It 
will be appreciated that the basic apprehension here is about competition with 
low  wage  countries,  rather  than  those  simply  with  low  labour  standards.  In 
practical terms low wages and low standards generally go together. There is 
also, however, an implicit dynamic argument underpinning the weak form of 
the  race-to-the-bottom  hypothesis:  in  the  absence  of  FACB  core  standards, 
which would provide Southern workers with a mechanism to raise wages and/or 
labour  standards,  developing  countries  would  become  even  more  of  a 
competitive threat over time, as their wages may not rise adequately given their 
productivity growth. 
 
In its strong form the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis suggests that globalisation 
may not only create labour market difficulties for advanced country workers, it 
will inevitably lead to a competitive erosion of labour standards everywhere 
including  in  advanced  countries  themselves.  This  is  the  implication  of  the 
extract from the Preamble to the ILO’s Constitution quoted in Section 1. To 
avoid terminological confusion it may be useful to note that globalisation here 
refers to liberalisation of trade and of long-term capital movements (i.e. FDI) 
between countries (we shall return to this matter in section 7, which will also   7 
 
consider  the  question  of  short-term  capital  movements,  i.e.  financial 
globalisation). 
 
To investigate the weak and the strong form of race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, 
the following specific issues would need to be addressed: 
 
￿ Has there been deterioration in labour market conditions in the North 
during  the  last  two  decades  (the  era  of  globalisation)  when 
international competition has become more intense? 
 
￿ If there is deterioration, is it due to greater competition, particularly 
due to trade with developing countries with sweatshop conditions? 
 
￿ Have North-South interactions in this area resulted in the race-to-the-
bottom for labour standards in all countries, as the strong form of this 
hypothesis suggests? 
 
2.1  Labour Market Deficits in the North 
The  labour  markets in  advanced countries during  the last two decades have 
suffered  from  important  deficits:  (a)  increased  wage  dispersion  and  income 
inequality in some countries particularly the US; (b) mass unemployment in 
European countries and (c) ‘de-industrialisation’ in most advanced countries. A 
main issue here has been to what extent, if any, can these deficits be ascribed to 
globalisation, and specifically to trade with low income, low labour standards 
developing  countries.  The  following  stylized  facts  give  an  indication  of  the 
nature of the North’s labour market deficits:   
 
￿ The growth rate of average real wage in the U.S. economy was 0.25 per 
cent a year during the 1980s and 1990s compared with the historic norm 
of 2 per cent a year.  
 
￿ Wage  dispersion  and  income  inequality  in  the  U.S.  greatly  increased 
during the 1980s and ‘90s, after having remained steady or declined for 
almost fifty years before. 
 
￿ There was also considerable de-industrialisation with millions of people 
losing good jobs in manufacturing and being relocated in ‘informalised’ 
service sector jobs, or remaining unemployed.  
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￿ In Europe, in  contrast,  the  main  deficit has been  mass unemployment 
instead of increased inequality. (This is often ascribed to Europe’s greater 
labour  market  inflexibility  compared  to  the  US).  There  was  also 
considerable  de-industrialisation  with  consequences  broadly  similar  to 
those in the U.S. 
 
Coincidently  these  labour  market  difficulties  in  the  North  have  occurred  at 
much the same time as the big rise in the South’s manufactured exports to the 
North and a huge increase in FDI investment in the South. As a consequence, 
the share of industrialized countries in world manufacturing exports fell from 83 
per  cent  in  1980-82  to  71  per  cent  in  1996-98,  while  in  the  same  period, 
developing countries’ share rose from 12 per cent to 25 per cent. Data presented 
in Table 2 indicates the fact that a group of about two dozen manufacturers-
exporting developing countries (ME), over the period 1980-82 to 1996-98, have 
been  greatly  increasing  their  import  penetration  not  only  of  industrialised 
developed countries but also providing these countries with severe competition 
in all other developing regions.  
 
Table 3 suggests a nearly five-fold increase in FDI inflows as a percentage of 
gross domestic capital formation in all industries in the world as a whole over 
the last two decades. However, developing countries have done better in this 
respect than developed countries and their advantage is greater still in FDI flows 
into manufacturing, leading to fears of ‘hollowing out’ of industry in advanced 
countries. 
 
Table 2.   Percentage Distribution of Manufactured Imports by Source Region 1980-82 and 
1996-98 
 
                                         Importing region 
ID  ME  PE  DC 
Source 
region 
1980-82  1996-98  1980-82  1996-98  1980-82  1996-98  1980-82  1996-98 
 
ID  87.0  74.8  82.3  62.2  85.2  74.3  79.6  62.7 
ME  10.3  21.4  15.8  36.5  9.2  22.0  13.0  29.8 
PE  0.4  0.7  0.6  0.5  1.8  1.8  1.1  1.5 
DC  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.9  1.8  3.7  1.5 
TC  2.2  2.8  0.9  0.3  2.9  0.1  2.6  4.5 
Source:  Ghose (2003) 
 
Notes: 
ID=   Industrialized Countries 
ME=   Manufactures-exporting developing countries (24) 
PE=    Petroleum-exporting developing countries (17) 
DC=    Developing countries (90)   9 
 
Table 3.  The Importance of FDI Flows in Capital Formation, by Region and Sector 1980, 







FDI inflows as a 




FDI inflows as a 










1980  2.3  9.0  3.4 
1990  4.7  14.0  5.4 
1998  11.1  21.6  13.9 
Developed Countries 
1980  2.7  8.5  3.4 
1990  4.9  11.9  5.2 
1998  10.9  16.6  12.9 
Developing Countries 
1980  1.2  11.7  3.6 
1990  4.0  22.3  6.7 
1998  11.5  36.7  17.7 
Central and Eastern Europe 
1980  0.1                 -               - 
1990  1.5                 -  0.7 
1998  12.9                 -  16.2 
Source: United Nations 2000, pp. 5. 
 
 
The coincidence of timing does not, however, establish causation. On the causal 
connection between North’s labour market deficits and trade with the South, 
there  is  a  voluminous  and  often  contentious  literature.  It  has  nevertheless 
reached some robust empirical conclusions. The relevant ones for our purpose 
may be summarized as follows
9. 
 
￿ De-industrialisation in the North is mostly a product of economic and 
technological developments internal to these economies and it has very 
little  to  do  with  trade  with  developing  countries.  Indeed,  for  some 
Northern countries, in some periods, manufacturing trade with the South 
may have increased employment rather than to have reduced it. 
 
￿ Most recent empirical research indicates that the available evidence is not 
compatible with the hypothesis that increased income inequality, say in 
the US, is to any significant degree due to North/South manufacturing 
trade. 
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￿ It is difficult to ascribe  Europe’s  mass unemployment  to its relatively 
small  manufacturing  trade  with  developing  countries.  The  literature 
singles out other more important proximate causes, namely labour market 
rigidities and a decline in the trend rate of growth of real demand and of 
output during the last two decades, compared with the 1950s and 60s. 
 
Thus, the available evidence does not on the whole provide much support for 
the  weak  form  of  the  ‘race-to-the-bottom’  theory.  There  is,  however,  an 
important caveat that deserves attention. The fact that manufacturing trade with 
the South has so far not caused any general harm, or may even have benefited 




3.  Erosion of Labour Standards in the South and the North  
 
We turn now to assessing the strong form of the ‘race to the bottom’ hypothesis, 
i.e.  that  a  deficit  in  labour  standards  in  one  country  leads,  because  of 
competition, to similar deficits in other countries and ultimately to the erosion 
of  labour  standards  in  advanced  countries  themselves.  For  this  purpose,  we 
explore in the first instance in this section, with broad-brush evidence, what has 
happened  to  labour  standards  in  the  South  and  the  North  (more  detailed 
microeconomic  research  will  be  presented  in  the  next  section).  A  broader 
conception of  labour  standards will be more  useful  for  the purposes of this 
exercise than simply relying on FACB – the two core standards. This is in part 
because countries of the North usually have core as well as non-core standards. 
The second reason is that the generally agreed quantitative measures of core 




In assessing labour standards and their erosion, we shall therefore use a variety 
of indicators, including the rate of growth of the economy and of real wages, 
indicators of structural change, those of social security measures, health and 
safety, and unionisation, among other variables. Ghose (2003) has argued that 
labour standards are best measured by the non-wage component of workers’ 
remuneration, for which he regards the growth of real wages to be a good proxy. 
Be that as it may, the overall picture that emerges from a consideration of these 
broad aggregate data (only some of which is reported in Tables 4-6, on pages 13 
and 14) for economies in different regions, is varied and mixed. The following 
patterns in broad groupings of countries can be identified: 
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1.  Real  wages  and  labour  standards  generally  improved  in  East  Asian 
countries until the financial crisis of 1997, particularly in Korea, Taiwan, 
and  other  fast-growing  NICs.  This  is  reflected  both  in  increased  real 
wages, faster structural change from agriculture to manufacturing, faster 
growth  of  employment,  improvements  in  health  and  safety  standards. 
These  countries  also  experienced,  before  the  financial  crisis,  reduced 




The  1997  acute  economic  and  financial  crisis  in  Asia  led  to  a  large 
contraction of GDP, particularly in the affected countries. However, most 
of  these  countries  have  bounced  back  fairly  quickly,  and  are  in  the 
process of returning to their long-term growth paths. It is significant that 
in  countries  like  Korea,  the  economic  crisis  has  also  led  to  some 
improvement in labour standards, but in a new direction: the government 
instituted welfare state protections for citizens in the wake of the crisis. 
 
The improvements in labour standards in successful East Asian countries, 
before the financial crisis of 1997 (say between 1980 and 1996), provide 
good  evidence  against  the  strong  form  of  the  ‘race  to  the  bottom’ 
hypothesis. This is all the more significant since East Asia, among all the 
developing regions, was in much of this period the largest exporter of 
labour-intensive manufactures to the U.S. economy. 
 
2.  Conceived in these broad terms, the data for Latin American countries 
suggests a fall in labour standards during the last two decades. Tokman 
(1997) has estimated that 90% of the new jobs created in Latin America 
between 1987 and 1995 were in the informal sector. This informalisation 
together with the evidence on the increased casualisation of the workers 
can be regarded as an erosion of labour standards. However, such erosion 
is more likely to be due to much reduced overall economic growth in that 
region, rather than to the mechanism specified in the race-to-the-bottom 
theory. A decline in the pace of economic growth reduces the creation of 
good jobs, i.e. with good labour standards, and increases informalisation.  
It is also connected with the changes in overall economic and political 
policies  in  Latin  America  associated  with  the  Washington  Consensus, 
rather than representing a competitive erosion of labour standards.                                                     
 
3.  Labour standards also fell in the 1980s and ‘90s in the U.S. and European 
Community  countries.  This  is  reflected  in  reduced  unionisation,  in 
restrictions on welfare state benefits, on the right to strike, on picketing 
and so on. As Standing (2003) observes ‘there has been a widespread   12 
 
de-unionisation,  particularly  in  industrialised  market  economies.  There 
has also been an erosion of the strength of freedom of association. Some 
countries have made it harder to organise, to bargain collectively, many 
have  ‘chipped  away  at  bargaining  rights,  and  many  have  pushed 
collective bodies such as unions to a more marginal role in social policy.’ 
 
Competitive erosion of labour standards could have played a part in this 
phenomenon. If so, it is more likely to have been competition among 
advanced  countries  themselves  rather  than that  between  advanced  and 
developing  countries.  Evidence  suggests  that  broader  worldwide 
ideological, economic and political trends have probably been much more 
important. Thus, Baldwin (2003) concludes his comprehensive study of 
the  decline  of  the  US  unions  during  the  last  two  decades  and  its 
relationship to trade in the following terms: 
 
We  find that  increased openness to  trade  with  other  countries 
plays only a modest role in US de-unionization. Many workers 
not employed in trade-related activities have also been adversely 
affected by the decline in unionization. This decline of unions 
seems  due  mainly  to  fundamental  changes  in  attitudes  and 
institutions associated with increased economic competitiveness 
throughout the entire economy,  including  employer  opposition 
and worker disenchantment.     
 
4.  Again, as in the case of the weak form of race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, 
there is also a similar coincidence of timing with its strong form. The 
erosion  of  labour  standards in industrial  countries has occurred  at  the 
same time as the large increase in North-South trade in manufactures.  
However,  as  explained  above,  the  latter  is  not  the  main  cause  of  the 
former. 
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Table 4.   Indicators related to the international competitiveness of exporters of manufactures 
in 26 developing economies 
 









Argentina (1984-1996)  50.5  101.9  73.5 
Bolivia (1980-1997)  73.9  66.7  78.7 
Brazil (1985-1995)  114.8
iv  96.3  137.4 
Chile  180.4  82.1  148.0 
China (1980-1999)  142.3  ..  .. 
Colombia  138.2  101.0  136.0 
Côte d’Ivoire (1980-1997)  110.2  103.9  107.8 
Ecuador (1980-1999)  105.9  36.7  54.0 
Egypt (1980-1997)  158.8  42.5  69.3 
       
Ghana (1980-1995)  77.9  81.0  221.5 
India  279.9  52.8  145.9 
Indonesia (1980-1999)  228.2  81.7  188.0 
Kenya (1980-1999)  120.1  61.8  74.1 
Malaysia  255.2  84.9  216.5 
Mexico (1984-2000)  113.0  90.2  100.7 
Morocco (1980-1999)  136.3  60.8  82.9 
Nigeria (1980-1996)  183.3  25.3  18.1 
Pakistan (1980-1996)  177.1  95.2  181.4 
       
Peru (1980-1996)  140.1
v  47.4  36.2 
Philippines (1980-1997)  202.6  80.5  163.0 
Republic of Korea  459.5  72.1  329.8 
Taiwan Province of China (1980-1996)  205.9  121.0  248.6 
Thailand (1982-1994)  98.6  140.9  105.9 
Turkey  197.0  54.5  107.8 
Uruguay (1980-1999)  146.6  68.0  98.5 
Venezuela (1980-1998)  136.2  19.2  26.3 
Source:  UNCTAD, 2003. 
 
Notes:  Index numbers for 2000 with 1980 = 100, unless otherwise indicated 
 
i  Real value added per worker calculated by deflating value added (in United States 
dollars) per worker by the GDP-deflator. 
ii  Ratio of nominal wages in manufacturing (deflated by the consumer price index) to value 
added in manufacturing (deflated by the GDP-deflator). An index number higher than 100 
indicates an increase in the share of labour in the functional distribution of income.  
iii  Nominal wage per worker deflated by the consumer price index. 
iv  1990-1995. 
v  1982-1996.   
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Table 5.  Trends In GDP Growth Selected developing regions and industrialized countries, 
1965-2000 (Average Annual Percentage Growth) 
 
Region/Country  1965-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000 
China  6.8  9.3  10.1 
India  3.6  5.9  5.4 
Middle income economies  6.3  2.3  3.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean  6.0  1.1  3.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.2  1.7  2.2 
South Asia  3.6  5.8  5.2 
East Asia and Pacific  7.3  7.4  7.7 
High income economies 
·  United States                   










World  4.1  3.0  2.6 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Report, various issues. 
 
 




Value Added As % of GDP 
   Agricultural    Industry  Services 
  2000   2000    2000 
World      5w    31w    63w 
Low Income Countries    23    33    44 
Middle Income Countries    11    36    54 
Low and Middle Income Countries    13    35    52 
East Asia and Pacific    15    46    38 
Latin America and the Caribbean      8    31    16 
South Asia    27    26    47 
Sub-Saharan Africa    15    28    57 
Source:  World Bank, 2002.   15 
 
4.  Labour Standards: Costs and Benefits to Developing Countries 
 
Turning  now  to  the  economics  of  labour  standards  from  the  perspective  of 
developing  countries,  an  important  issue  is  whether  the  imposition  of 
compulsory core labour standards will affect the international competitiveness 
of  poor  countries.  Such  standards  can,  in  principle,  have  both  negative  and 
positive  consequences  depending  on  the  country’s  history,  the  nature  of  its 
labour legislation, the strength of its unions and their propensity to strike. The 
latter  may  in  turn  depend  on  the  institutions  the  society  has  evolved  for 
settlement of disputes. In dynamic terms unions may have a positive effect on 
labour  productivity  by  raising  wages  and  obliging  the  firm  to  introduce 
productivity  enhancing  technology.  This  is  the  model  successfully  used  in 
Sweden in the post-war period to increase competitiveness, economic growth 
and social welfare (see Erixon 2002); however, in a developing country context 
with enormous surplus labour this is unlikely to be helpful. Moreover, it is not 
difficult to imagine that unions could become totally dysfunctional, engaging in 
restrictive  work  practices,  discouraging  technical  progress  or  engaging  in 
collective bargaining without any wider social concern for the unemployed or 
those in the informal sector
12. 
 
There is a general dearth of empirical studies on the costs and benefits of labour 
standards for developing countries. A handful of such studies are available but 
these do not contain any robust empirical results. A much richer literature on 
these kinds of issues exists for developed countries. Broadly, a great deal of 
research  indicates  that  in  advanced  countries  the  unions  can  raise  wages 
typically by up to 20 per cent. For developing countries, the small amount of 
available research indicates that the union wage premia are  normally lower, 
perhaps in the order of 5-10 percent. However, as IDB (2004) points out these 
gains are small when compared with the gains associated with experience or 
education. It observes that few workers would be able to lift their wages beyond 
poverty relying solely on union activity.  
 
DFID  (2003)  has  recently  reviewed  evidence  on  core  labour  standards  and 
competitiveness. That review indicates that labour costs do increase as a result 
of  the  implementation  of  labour  standards,  particularly  with  respect  to  free 
collective bargaining. However, these studies find no evidence of a negative 
relationship between higher labour standards and the foreign direct investment 
that the country receives. OECD studies (1996, 2000) found no relationship 
between  core  labour  standards  and  sectoral  trade  patterns  and  export 
performance.  There are other  studies  (see  for example  Belser, 2001), which 
indicate  that  higher  labour  standards  tend  to  reduce  labour-intensive 
manufactured exports. Galli and Kucera (2002) examined the effects of core   16 
 
labour standards on “informalisation” of employment in Latin America to test a 
hypothesis in Singh and Zammit (2000), but could not find any evidence to 
confirm or reject it. 
 
Although there are very few economy wide or comparative international studies 
of  the  effects  of  labour  standards  on  economic  development,  there  is 
considerable research that investigates the micro-level effects of standards on 
both  firms  and  workers  in  developing  countries  [see  for  example  Blowfield 
(2001);  Barrientos  (2000);  Heeks  and  Duncombe  (2003)].  In  general,  these 
indicate both negative and positive outcomes, and suggest that the effect of 
labour standards in developing countries is likely to be complex, depending on 
country-specific and industry-specific factors.
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To sum up, one important conclusion from the above analysis is that much more 
empirical  work  is  required  on  the  effects  of  labour  standards  on  various 
developmental variables. The second significant conclusion is that, taking into 
account both the micro-level and macro-level evidence, available research for 
developing countries suggests that there are likely to be short to medium term 
costs  for  implementing  core  standards;  their  magnitude  and  the  time  period 
would differ very considerably between countries. For fast growing economies 
such as those in East Asia, the costs are unlikely to be prohibitive. The fast 
productivity growth in many of these countries allows them to raise real wages, 
in  principle  to  improve  labour  standards  and  at  the  same  time  remain 
competitive (see Table 4 on page 13). 
 
In  the  light  of  this  survey  of  empirical  evidence  a  referee  has  raised  the 
question, if the costs of implementing core labour standards would not be large 
for  many  developing  countries,  why  does  the  South  object  to  the  North’s 
proposals for multilateral agreement on labour standards? This is a legitimate 
and important question that will be taken up in section 6.  
 
 
5.  Informal Sector, the Dual Economy and Labour Standards 
 
The question of labour standards for developing countries derives its complexity 
in large part from the dual structure of these economies. Much of the labour 
force  in  the  South  works  in  rural  areas  as  wage  labourers,  tenant  farmers, 
self-employed small holders as well as people who are working in the rural and 
urban informal sectors. The central issue is how to improve the earnings and 
conditions of work of these diverse groups of male and female workers, as well 
as  those  who  are  self-employed.  For  example,  70  percent  of  the  Indian 
population lives in rural areas and only 7 percent of workers in the small urban   17 
 
sector are unionised. Table 7 provides some data that illustrates the nature of 
dual economy typically found in developing countries. The table reports the 
proportion of workers in different countries who work in small enterprises with 
1-4 or 5-9 workers. The data suggests that a very large proportion of workers in 
developing countries work in such enterprises, the percentages ranging from 35 
percent in Jamaica to 52 percent in Colombia, to 77 percent in Indonesia and to 
90 percent in Sierra Leone. The proportion of labour force in the U.S. working 
for enterprises with less than 10 workers was only about 4 percent.  
 
It  is  inherently  difficult  for  labour  standards  to  be  applied  to  these 
heterogeneous  groups  of  working  people  in  the  informal  sector.  The 
representational needs and the nature of collective organisations that would be 
most useful for these various groups are rather different from those that would 
be suitable for wage labourers working in big establishments in the modern 
formal sector. If labour standards are only to be limited to those working in the 
formal sector, this would amount to giving greater privileges to those who are 
already privileged. This would tend to increase inequality in the society that 
surely proponents of labour standards would not wish to promote. In any case 
such a course can hardly be taken by reasonably democratic governments in 
these countries who have to live with the social and political consequences of 
what  would  be  seen  as  compounded  unfairness.  What  is  required  in  many 
countries is that labour standards should not be further raised in the privileged 
modern  sector  and  instead  efforts  should  go  into  introducing  these  in 
appropriate forms in the informal sector. This is a far bigger challenge than 
persuading Nike to introduce non-sweatshop working conditions in its factories 
in developing countries.  
 
Singh  and  Zammit  (2000)  suggested  that  in  order  for  the  international 
community  to  recognise  the  enormity  and  importance  of  this  task,  ILO 
conventions on free collective bargaining, and freedom of association should be 
redrafted  to  reflect  these  concerns.  The  existing  texts  of  these  conventions 
suggest  that  their  main  objective  is  to  provide  representation  and  voice  for 
workers in large factories through traditional trade unions, which can freely 
bargain with employers for wages and working conditions. The conventions 
appear  to  assume  that  trade  unions,  employers’  organisations  and  other 
institutional  infrastructure  for  dispute  settlement  are  already  in  place.  The 
governments  therefore  do  not  need  to,  and  should  not,  intervene  in  this 
bargaining process.  
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Table 7.   Distribution of Employment Shares for Small Enterprises in Developing Countries 
and the U.S. 
 
Number of Workers 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  1 - 4  5 – 9 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
United States, 1992  1.3  2.6 
Mexico, 1993  13.8  4.5   
Indonesia, 1986  44.2 
S. Korea, 1973  7.9 
S. Korea, 1988    12 
Taiwan, 1986    20 
India, 1971  42 
Tanzania, 1967  56 
Ghana, 1970  84 
Kenya, 1969  49 
Sierra Leone, 1974  90 
Indonesia, 1977  77 
Zambia, 1985  83 
Honduras, 1979  68 
Thailand, 1978  58 
Philippines, 1974  66 
Nigeria, 1972  59 
Jamaica, 1978  35 
Colombia, 1973  52 
Korea, 1975  40 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  Adapted from Tybout (2000).   
For original sources for each country, see Tybout (2000) 
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Such  assumptions  cannot  be  made  for  many  developing  countries.  
Consequently developing country governments are often obliged to intervene in 
this collective bargaining process for good reasons. These include: 
 
￿ to make up for the deficiencies of the institutional structure for dispute 
settlement. 
 
￿ when  there  is  gross  disparity  between  the  bargaining  parties,  the 
government may be obliged to intervene so as to help secure an equitable 
settlement. 
 
￿ to  represent  the  interest  of  those  in  the  informal  sector  who  may  be 
affected by the bargains between the employers and employees in the 
formal sector. 
 
￿ to  promote  cooperation  between  employers,  employees  and  those 
working in the informal sector for common national good, rather than 
have  adversarial  relations  between  these  groups  which  a  developing 
country can ill-afford. 
 
There are of course also many bad reasons why governments may intervene in 
free  collective  bargaining,  but  we  would  like  to  emphasise  that  there  are 
perfectly good reasons as well for doing so. Therefore, in addition to calling 
specific attention to the informal sector and agricultural workers in the proposed 
revisions  to  conventions  87  and  98,  these  revised  conventions  should  also 
recognise that in the developing country context, there is a positive role for the 
government in order to carry out the tasks listed above. 
 
Colleagues  at  the  ILO  have  suggested  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  revise 
conventions 87 and 98 in order to create organisations of different kinds to meet 
the representational needs of farmers and other informal sector workers. This is 
a plausible argument but we would suggest that our proposal has the virtue of 
highlighting  for  the  international  community  the  difficulties  faced  by  these 
excluded groups in the implementation of labour standards. Our proposal is also 
useful in emphasising the critical role of the government in helping in various 
ways in carrying out these developmental tasks. We have no doubt that explicit 
attention to these issues in the texts of the respective conventions would lead to 
rather different kinds of annual or biannual reports on labour standards from the 
ILO’s Director General than now. These would better reflect the progress being 
made  with  implementing  labour  standards  for  all  the  working people  in  the 
world rather than just the small proportion in the formal sector.    20 
 
6.  Poverty, Core Labour Standards and the WTO 
 
At its Millennium meeting, the UN General Assembly agreed to make poverty 
reduction as a major priority for nations and people of the world. Freedom from 
hunger and poverty, and the right to decent living would be regarded by many 
people as much a fundamental human right as those embodied in the ILO’s core 
conventions, including the rights to freedom of association and free collective 
bargaining.   
 
At an operational level, the international community and developing countries 
give signal importance to reducing poverty (see for example DFID, 2003). This 
fact and its implications are not recognised in the ILO’s conventions on core 
labour standards. From a developing country’s perspective, the core should be 
broadened to include a new convention that provides protection against hunger 
and poverty and gives everyone the right to a decent livelihood.  
 
Things would be easy if it were the case that promoting core labour standards 
was synonymous with reducing poverty. However, it is far from certain that the 
encouragement of these standards in the formal sector in developing countries 
reduces poverty at all, let alone being the best way of doing so. Indeed, under 
plausible assumptions, the promotion of labour standards in the small formal 
sector can lead to reduced employment in this sector and even greater burden on 
the informal sector, reducing wages (and increasing poverty) in that sector. 
 
Previous  analysis  suggests  that  one  important  way  of  reconciling  poverty 
reduction  with  pursuit  of  core  labour  standards,  as  presently  specified,  is 
through the agency of faster and “high quality” economic growth. There is a 
robust relationship between growth and poverty reduction. However, in addition 
to  growth,  poverty  is  also  affected  by  other  variables;  notably  inflation, 
inequality of income and asset distribution, instability of economic growth and 
government fiscal policies. Further, economic growth does not automatically 
trickle down to those who need it most and hence government interventions are 
required to  ensure that  economic growth reduces  poverty  most effectively.
14  
Similarly, as noted in Section 3, if the growth is fast enough it would also 
promote labour standards both directly through structural change and indirectly 
by reducing the costs of adjustment to the standards. 
  
It may be useful at this point to consider the referee’s question raised at the end 
of  section 4; the question is important and answering  it  would also help to 
clarify our perspective on the subject. In the light of the empirical conclusions 
of section 3 and 4 and the analysis presented so far, developing countries would 
have several objections to a multilateral agreement on labour standards under   21 
 
WTO, such as that preferred by advanced countries. Some of these misgivings 
have been put forward in previous sections but may be stated explicitly in this 
context as follows: 
 
1.  The  implementation  of  core  labour  standards  under  the  present 
institutional arrangements would mean, for many developing countries, 
such standards being available only to the formal sector. It will essentially 
exclude  the  vast  majority  of  working  people  who  are  in  the  informal 
sector.  
 
2.  Instead  of  promoting  cohesion  and  leading  to  a  more  equitable 
distribution of the fruits of economic progress, as claimed by proponents 
of labour standards, their implementation would, as indicated in section 5, 
do the opposite.  
 
3.  The huge heterogeneity in the levels of economic development and the 
economic circumstances of developing countries, would mean that there 
will  be  many  countries  for  whom  there  could  be  sizeable  costs  of 
adjustment to standards which they cannot afford; it may also take them a 
long time to acquire the domestic institutions required, for example, for a 
workable trade union culture. 
 
4.  There is also the important question of minimum wage. Although it is not 
included in the ILO’s core labour standards, it figures prominently (as 
indicated earlier) in all new U.S. bilateral trade treaties with developing 
countries. It is only a matter of time before it is introduced fully into the 
multilateral fora. Depending on the level at which the minimum wage is 
set, such an evolution of labour standards in the medium-term cannot be 
ruled  out;  it  would  have  significant  implications  for  the  comparative 
advantage of low wage, low labour standards developing countries. 
 
5.  Developing  countries  have  particular  reservations  about  the  WTO’s 
Dispute Settlements Mechanism, which gives the organisation its ‘teeth’, 
i.e. ability to punish the offenders. However, this mechanism is regarded 
as unfair to developing countries because of the inherent asymmetries in 
its procedures. It is much easier, for example, for a developed country to 
impose  sanctions  on  a  poor  small  country  than  the  other  way  round 
(UNDP, 2003). 
 
6.  Developing countries regard compulsory labour standards as a part and 
parcel  of  the  increasing  burdensome  conditionality  from  international   22 
 
financial organisations to which they have been subject. They need policy 
autonomy instead of another layer of conditionality (Singh, 2002). 
 
7.  Developing  countries  note  that  despite  the  strong  affirmation  in  the 
‘race-to-the-bottom’  argument  in  the  eighty-year-old  ILO  constitution 
(see section 1), and at a time when essentially only advanced countries 
were members, the organisation took a deliberate decision not to impose 
sanctions on the offenders but rather to persuade them. That is the reason 
why  developing  countries  believe  that  the  ILO  and  its  constructive 
approach  to  the  pursuit  of  labour  standards,  in  cooperation  with 
developing countries and their tripartite constituencies, is the best way to 
proceed.   
 
8.  Developing  countries  and  other critics  also  suggest that punishing  the 
offenders would mean in practice sanctions against the guilty country’s 
exporting  firms  that,  most  likely,  already  have  relatively  high  labour 
standards. Further, it would do nothing for those who need them most in 
the informal sector. 
 
The bottom line is that developing countries regard poverty reduction as the 
chief  priority  rather  than  the  core  labour  standards.  The  challenge  lies  in 
combining the two. This would involve, for example, a change in the focus of 
anti-sweatshop and corporate social responsibility  movements in the US and 
other advanced countries towards poverty reduction and the informal sector. In 
addition, the US trade unions can help in the positive task of providing research 
capacity,  technical assistance  and  training  for introducing  appropriate labour 
standards  in  the  informal  sector  in  developing  countries,  so  that  they  are 
compatible with poverty reduction
15. 
 
Finally, it may be useful to take up the question of the Export Processing Zones  
(EPZs)  in  relation  to  labour  standards.  Many  commentators  in  advanced 
countries have regarded these zones as sources of  “social dumping”, where 
labour laws are not enforced in order to attract FDI. However, research by ILO 
and independent scholars suggest that there is no substance at all to the charge 
of social dumping. Evidence suggests that export-oriented firms, particularly 
those in EPZs pay better wages and have much superior working conditions 
than firms producing similar products for domestic markets. It is also found that 
the vast majority of the EPZs are covered by the national labour laws of their 
countries (Ghose, 2003; Moran, 2002; ILO, 1998; Oxfam, 2002).  
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7.  Towards North South Solidarity 
 
Since the demise of the Golden Age, labour in much of the world has been in 
retreat. In the North, as noted in section 3, there has been a significant erosion 
of  core  and  non-core  labour  standards.  Similarly,  over  this  period,  poverty, 
informalisation and casualisation of work have in general greatly increased in 
developing countries except for some countries in Asia. 
 
Glyn et al (1990) and Singh (1995, 1997) have argued that liberalisation and 
globalisation  of  world  economy  represents  a  new  model  of  economic 
development  compared  with  that  of  the  Golden  Age.  It  is  characterised  by 
market supremacy and intensified competition in all markets. The model has 
been working now for almost two decades in the North and for more than a 
decade in the South. Its overall results in terms of economic well-being have not 
been good either for workers in the North or for labour in Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Asian countries, particularly China and India, have been 
more successful, arguably because the governments in these countries have not 
liberalised either the trade regimes or capital account regimes as fully as, for 
example, the Latin American countries. Moreover, the Asian governments have 
continued to back their respective accumulation regimes and the institutions that 
support them (see further UNCTAD (2003)).   
 
Table 5 (on page 14) indicates that the overall world economic performance has 
deteriorated in the 1980s and 90s compared with the pre-1980s period. This is 
surprising  from  the  perspective  of  the  neo-liberal  model  that  underpins 
liberalisation  and  globalisation,  since  the  world  economy  is  much  more 
competitive  now,  labour  markets  are  more  flexible  and  there  is  far  greater 
mobility of capital than before. Moreover, we now have the revolutionary new 
technology of ICT with a huge potential not only for spawning new industries, 
but also for raising productivity in the existing ones. All of this, in orthodox 
terms, should have raised world economic growth, but instead we see a decline.  
 
Elliott and Freeman (2003) suggest that there is a close symbiotic relationship 
between globalisation and labour standards, with each complementing the other 
in a virtuous circle. We have difficulties with this conception as it seems to us 
that, under current globalisation, where there is freely mobile capital, labour is 
at a serious disadvantage. Further, when the overall outcome (as seen above) is 
slow  economic  growth,  it  creates  further  difficulties  for  labour  because 
competition  becomes  much  more  intense  and  leads  to  conflicts  of  interests 
between workers, particularly those in rich and poor countries.  
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Labour,  North  and  South,  to  protect  itself  must  propose  radical  changes  in 
current globalisation and should have a program of its own which would benefit 
workers in both regions. A model of alternative globalisation has been presented 
in  Singh  (1999,  2000)  and  Singh  and  Zammit  (2000).  Unlike  current 
globalisation that is divisive, the alternative model indicates how the interests of 
the workers of the North and the South can be aligned. The alternative path is 
essentially one of an international Keynesian regime of managed world trade
16 
and  controlled  international  capital  movements
17  with  measures  to  increase 
worldwide  demand  for  labour.  The  national  and  international  institutions 
required  to  provide  the  basis  for  such  a  regime  are,  not  surprisingly,  rather 
different  from  those  underpinning  the  current  globalisation  project.  The 
alternative  model,  it  is  suggested,  would  not  only  bring  closer  North-South 
co-operation, but also lead to full employment of the world’s resources and to a 
faster rate of economic growth, thereby reducing poverty and helping promote 
labour  standards  in  both  the  North  and  the  South.  The  main  elements,  the 
feasibility  and  the desirability  of  such  a  policy programme  are  examined  in 
some detail in the research cited above.    
 
 
8.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
In view of the complexity of its subject matter, this paper has been wide-ranging 
in scope. Some of its main points are summarised below: 
 
￿ In the first part, the paper has concentrated on the important question of 
the race-to-the-bottom, which, it is suggested, results from the lack of 
labour standards, particularly the core standards of FACB in developing 
countries. Two versions of this theory are examined: a weaker version 
which suggests that the labour market deficits of the North’s labour are 
mainly due to low wages and low labour standards in the South. In its 
strong form, the hypothesis asserts that the absence of labour standards in 
the  South  leads,  through  competition,  to  erosion  of  these  standards 
everywhere, including in Northern countries. This paper has found very 
little  evidence  to  support  either  form  of  the  race-to-the-bottom 
hypothesis. This is not to say that these could not become more important 
in the future.   
 
￿ The  second  part  of  the  paper  examined  the  analogous  question  for 
developing  countries:  how  would  their  competitiveness be affected by 
adoption of the core labour standards of FACB?  There is not sufficient 
research to provide firm guidance on this issue, but generally, the totality   25 
 
of available studies suggests that these costs would not be very large and 
for fast-growing developing countries they are easily overcome.   
 
￿ Labour  standards  are  particularly  difficult  to  achieve  in  the  informal 
sector,  both  urban  and  rural,  and  in  agriculture.  In  these  cases,  the 
representational  needs  as  well  as  the  organisational  methods  are  quite 
different to those used in the urban formal sector. This is one of the main 
reasons why progress in the achievement of labour standards in many 
parts of the Third World has been slow. 
 
￿ Despite all the difficulties of establishing labour standards in the informal 
sector, it is a task from which there is no escape. Extending the standards 
to  just  the  formal  sector  would  be  highly  iniquitous,  and  would  not 
therefore be politically acceptable. In order to highlight these difficulties, 
and to get an accurate picture of the progress of labour standards in a 
developing country economy, the paper suggests that ILO conventions 87 
and 98 should be suitably amended to reflect these concerns. Similarly, 
the conventions should recognise the positive role that governments can 
play in a number of ways in helping to obtain representation and redress 
for working people in the informal sector.   
 
￿ It is argued here that the ILO’s core conventions are too restrictive. The 
core should be broadened to include freedom from hunger and poverty 
and the right to decent living as a new convention to reflect this primary 
concern of developing countries and the international community. 
 
￿ It  is  suggested  here  that  labour  standards  are  important  indicators  of 
economic  development,  but  their  promotion  is  best  achieved  in  a 
non-coercive  and  supportive  international  environment,  such  as  that 
provided  by  the  ILO.  The  analysis  presented  here  indicates  that 
compulsory labour standards would be non-optimal both for advanced 
and  developing  countries.  They  would  neither  achieve  their  stated 
purpose or even the protectionist agenda of certain interests in advanced 
countries. In view of recent history of the North-South interactions on this 
subject, the paper suggests, it will not be helpful to involve the WTO with 
its punitive powers (via the Dispute Settlement Mechanism) in this area. 
 
￿ The paper argues that the current globalisation regime based in part on 
free capital movements is inimical to the interests of labour both in the 
North  and  South.  It  briefly  presents  the  contours  of  an  alternative 
globalisation that would both help reduce poverty in developing countries 
and  promote  labour  standards  in  advanced,  as  well  as  developing   26 
 
countries.  It  would  do  so  by  making  possible  fast  and  high  quality 
economic  growth,  underpinned  by  appropriate  government  fiscal  and 
other interventions in domestic economy and rather different rules of the 
game  for  the  international  economy  from  those  under  current 
globalisation. 
 
Finally, let me quote Professor Srinivasan (2003), who has recently observed,  
 
“Let  me  conclude  by  saying  that  the  crux  of  the  debate  is  not 
whether…freedom of association and other dimensions of core labour 
standards  are  desirable  objectives…The  debate  is  about  the 
desirability of using trade sanctions for enforcing them. On this the 
answer is very clear to most economists. It is emphatically that it is 
not.” 
   
We have reached the same conclusion as Professor Srinivasan, but on the basis 










1   For  a  fuller  discussion  of  the  historical  evolution  of  the  north-south 
controversy  on  labour  standards  in  relation  to  trade,  at  various  fora 
including the WTO and ILO, see Singh and Zammit (2000), Annex 1; 
Elliot and Freeman (2003) and CUTS (forthcoming). 
 
2   This  was  subsequently  amplified  by  the  Convention  Concerning  the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, (Convention No. 182). 
 
3   Quoted in Elliott and Freeman (2003), p.4. 
 
4   An important criticism by Srinivasan (2003) of much of the literature, 
both theoretical and empirical, on this subject is its neglect of economic 
growth. 
 
5   There is a large literature on child labour. For a recent review see Brown, 
Deardorff and Stern (2003). The other core conventions on the abolition 
of forced labour and non-discrimination are not a matter for contention 
and are generally accepted by the international community. 
 
6   For an insightful recent review of the large theoretical literature on these 
moral and philosophical questions, see N. Singh (2003). 
 
7   For a critical analysis of the absolutist position see Fields (1995). 
 
8   See Winters (2003) for a critique of Staiger’s position. 
 
9   There is  a  huge  literature  on  each  of  the  three  aspects  of  the  subject 
referred  to in the  text.  For recent  reviews  on  the various aspects,  see 
Slaughter  and  Swagel,  1997;  Blanchflower  and  Slaughter,  1999; 
Rowthorn  and  Ramaswamy,  1997;  Atkinson,  1999;  Feenstra,  2000, 
Howes and Singh, 2000 and Singh, 2003. 
 
10   For an insightful discussion of these important measurement issues, see 






   28 
 
 
11   In this context, the following analysis of Hort and Kuhnle (2000) is also 
pertinent:  “Summing  up,  it  seems  that  East  and  South-east  Asian 
countries have introduced social security legislation in the same general 
sequence  as  was  followed  by  the  European  pioneers,  and  that  social 
security  has  been  introduced  earlier  in  ‘developmental  time’  than  in 
Europe.  Rapid  and  strong  economic  growth  has  in  general  been 
accompanied by state action for welfare institutions and programmes, and 
it seems that democratisation - exemplified by developments in Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand during the 1990s - leads to greater political efforts 
to  promote  welfare  state  development.”  See  Cho  et.  al.  (2004)  for  a 
somewhat  different  perspective  on  Korea  and  for  the  analysis  of  the 
position of women workers in that country. 
 
12    A number of international organisations and scholars believe that Indian 
trade unions are reaching that state quite rapidly, if they are not already 
there. India has one of the most advanced labour legislations in the world, 
but  unfortunately  it  is  obeyed  only  in  the  public  sector.  The  private 
formal sector by and large ignores the laws, as implementation is very 
poor. The vast informal sector, with its small family enterprises, lies by 
and  large  outside  its  purview.  See  further  DFID  (2003),  Besley  and 
Burgess (2002), and World Bank (2002). 
 
13   I am grateful to one of the referees of the paper for this point. 
 
14   For a fuller analysis of these issues see Singh, 2000 and the literature 
referred to therein. See also Sutcliffe (forthcoming). 
 
15   Labour  Standards  also  figure  in  the  UN  global  compacts  with 
multi-national  corporations.  These  compacts also  need  to  consider  the 
rural informal sector and poverty reduction in relation to codes on labour 
standards. See further Zammit, 2003. 
 
16   Lest “managed trade” may be regarded as suggesting either autarchy or 
solving a complex and vast planning problem, what is being proposed 
here  is  a  much  more  modest  measure,  such  as  permitting  developing 
countries to impose import restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons.  
This was allowed under GATT, but has effectively become impossible 
under the WTO. See Singh, 2003a. 
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17   As in the case of trade in the previous endnote, all that is being suggested 
in relation to capital movements is that developing countries should not 
be obliged to accept financial globalisation if they do not wish to – they 
should be able to impose capital controls. Unfortunately, however, the 
new  bilateral  “free  trade”  treaties  the  US  is  doing  with  individual 
developing  countries  usually  contain  a  clause  that  denies  the  partner 
country  any  right  to  impose  capital  controls,  particularly  against  US 
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